Peter Singer 1972

“Famine, Affluence, and Morality” by Peter Singer

​Peter Singer’s 1972 essay “Famine, Affluence, and Morality” makes a scathing condemnation of richer nations’ refusal to assist groups of people whose basic human needs are not being met.  This is part of a utilitarian philosophical argument that holds that the most ethical action that can be taken in any given situation is the action resulting in the greatest good for the greatest number of people.  Singer argues that the fact that there are people starving anywhere in the world is proof that the affluent are not doing enough to help humanity.  He suggests that basic human needs for all people universally are an essential prerequisite to any further economic gain.  Furthermore, he accuses affluent countries of misattributing value to human life because these nations spend more money on non-humanitarian pursuits.  Although his moralistic argument may seem extreme at first, Singer is actually right about the global responsibility we all have to ensure that everyone has food to eat, clean water to drink, a place to live, and basic sanitation.

​An important premise of Singer’s argument is that people with means have actual, tangible power to do something about starvation.  These financial means equate to power on the world stage.  As Singer (1972) writes, “if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it” (p. 2). By this logic, the simple choice not to take an action can have significant and even fatal consequences.  It would be difficult, if not impossible, for any citizen of an affluent nation to argue that his or her government does not possess sufficient power to influence the social and economic situations in the developing regions of the world.  

Therefore, we must reconsider where responsibility lies for these international problems of hunger and poverty.  We may be, according to Singer, more responsible than we would care to admit.  Unfortunately, we are not always accountable for this responsibility, as we do not take action to solve the problems within our power.  This is a major threat to most people’s thinking; rather than suggest that one is living a moral life as long as one is not directly harming others, Singer claims that inaction can be just as immoral.

​Many people might feel that being located so far away from blatant instances of human suffering can cause it to be difficult to have the kind of response to travesty that would come more naturally if we witnessed the suffering directly.  However, according to Singer, it should not, and does not, matter whether we personally observe the sorrow and anguish present all around the world. Singer clearly explains his position that proximity is irrelevant to the equation.  In other words, helping one person with whom we have actual contact is not more ethical than helping many more people who are far away, never to meet us.  The direct experience of helping makes people believe they are maximizing their moral behavior, but this is a deception according to Singer.  As Singer explains:

The fact that a person is physically near to us, so that we have personal contact with him, may make it more likely that we shall assist him, but this does not show that we ought to help him rather than another who happens to be further away. If we accept any principle of impartiality, universalizability, equality, or whatever, we cannot discriminate against someone merely because he is far away from us (or we are far away from him). (p. 2-3)

This is a very important point to understand because accepting it in practice would most likely imply that people would have to overlook the poverty and hardship in their immediate communities in favor of attempting to help alleviate the poverty and hardship in a country overseas.  

One important concession Singer gives to critics of this point is that proximity may help a person to determine or evaluate what the most pressing needs of the community are, and therefore how dire the circumstances for local residents may be.  However, Singer then debunks this position and reminds us that instant global communication has gotten rid of the excuse that we do not know what is happening in other parts of the world.  Given that “Famine, Affluence, and Morality” was written in 1972, it is virtually impossible not to agree with Singer about the accessibility of information through the internet and social media today.  Nearly four decades after Singer’s writing, we have little opportunity to plead ignorance about what is going on in the world around us.

After clarifying the issue of proximity, Singer also confronts another ethical deception that people use to fool themselves with.  Specifically, the author claims that it does not matter whether one is the only person who can do something to help another, or whether anyone (or everyone) else can also do something to help.  For example, if you are alone with a drowning child and you are the only person who can help her, you would probably feel a strong impetus to save her from her death.  However, if you are among billions of people, none of whom is willingly contributing to the human needs of less fortunate people somewhere else on earth, you may not feel such a strong or urgent motivation to help.  You might assume that someone else will provide the needed assistance, or you might assume that since no one is helping, there is no real need to help.  However, according to Singer, all of these perceptions are one hundred percent wrong.

Singer effectively backs up this argument through a rhetoric question to his readers.  He asks, “Should I consider that I am less obliged to pull the drowning child out of the pond if on looking around I see other people, no further away than I am, who have also noticed the child but are doing nothing?” (p. 3).  Such a notion would undoubtedly seem ridiculous to any conscientious reader, lending credence to Singer’s point.  Singer continues about “the absurdity of the view that numbers lessen obligation. It is a view that is an ideal excuse for inactivity; unfortunately most of the major evils - poverty, overpopulation, pollution - are problems in which everyone is almost equally involved” (p. 3).  This is a strong indictment of virtually every person living in affluent countries.  Many people will likely resent this condemnation and resist the ethical implications of it.  However, the level of discomfort it may cause in most people’s ethical perception of themselves is not a good reason to deny the sound logic of Singer’s argumentation.

Overall, Singer’s utilitarian philosophy as presented in “Famine, Affluence, and Morality” will be a difficult pill to swallow for many people.  This is because Singer’s philosophy of ethics carries with it a set of extremely clear practical implications that cannot be denied or ignored.  To disregard the practical implications of Singer’s ideas—what he calls the “duty” (p. 6) of all people—would be to deny the inherentcorrectness of his ideas.  But there is little actual, tangible criticism that one can successfully pose to Singer.  His argument is so sound that the only viable way a person can truly disagree with it is to simply proclaim an attitude of apathy.  If a person does not care about other human beings, if he can train himself to become desensitized and indifferent, then it is possible to dismiss Singer’s prescriptions for a more humane and ethical world.   However, for those of us who care about the children and adults who suffer from a severe lack of basic human needs,for those of us who are interested in doing everything we can to make the world a better place, Singer’s blueprint is an idea model to follow. JGAB